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Later, I saw the outside world, and I began to wonder how
it could be that the English, who were foreigners, were
able to achieve what they had achieved over 70 or 80
years with the sterile rock of Hong Kong, while China had
produced nothing to equal it in 4,000 years… We must
draw inspiration from the English and transpose their ex-
ample of good government into every region of China. 
Sun Yat-sen, addressing students of the University of
Hong Kong, 1923
W here are we in economic terms ten years afterHong Kong returned to China? This articleaims to show that since 1997 economic integra-
tion between the Hong Kong SAR and the People’s Repub-
lic of China has entered a new phase. Despite fundamental
differences, the two economies are more closely linked than
ever. The SAR has sought to affirm its identity by seeking to
adapt itself in the best possible way to the needs of the Chi-
nese economy. All the same, this relationship, with clearly
understood interests, involves macroeconomic risks for both
parties.
It was no accident that negotiations for the transfer of Hong
Kong’s sovereignty to China were undertaken in 1982 under
Deng Xiaoping, the father of economic reform. True, the
last treaty of 1898 provided for a 99-year lease over the New
Territories; but the various treaties ceding Hong Kong to the
British were never recognised by the nationalists or the Chi-
nese Communists. For the Chinese authorities, 1997 was
not therefore an absolutely decisive date in any sense: in
their view, sovereignty would be regained quite legitimately
“in due course”, as they put it((1). The opportune moment
presented itself when China moved towards a market econ-
omy in 1978: Deng Xiaoping had seen that Hong Kong
could provide the logistical support, the skills base, and the
liberal capitalist environment that would help him bring
about reform. Thus, of the four special economic zones set
up in 1980, three were established in Guangdong, a
province neighbouring Hong Kong. Exchanges between
Hong Kong and Guangdong intensified from 1985 onwards:
Hong Kong factories were firstly relocated in the special
economic zones and then progressively the Pearl River
Delta area. In 1990, total Hong Kong investments repre-
sented 80% of all foreign investment in the Chinese
province. The Hong Kong economy experienced an accel-
erated transformation—instead of an Asian dragon specialis-
ing in electronics, it became a service economy (90% of
GDP) dedicated to the Chinese economy. Henceforth, the
port of Victoria became the entry point for secondary re-
sources imported from Southeast Asia to be transformed
into consumer goods in the factories of Guangdong, before
being sent back to Hong Kong for export to the rest of the
world.
The transformation of Kowloon into a Chinese warehouse
and the transfer of Hong Kong capital to the Pearl River
Delta had therefore taken place before 1997. This is why
there were those who said that the handover facilitated what
was already happening but would not involve any major
change. The terms of the negotiations between the British
and Chinese authorities confirmed this view: Hong Kong
kept its economic, monetary and financial autonomy, in
other words its capitalist system, its currency, its own eco-
nomic regime, and outlawed any transfer of fiscal responsi-
bility to China. For Hong Kong residents the fear was rather
that, with the opening of the border, corruption might find
its way in through Chinese cadres and industry barons look-
ing to make a killing in Hong Kong. 
Where are we ten years on? This article seeks to show that
economic integration between Hong Kong and the PRC
has entered a new phase since 1997. Despite differences in
currencies, regulations, institutions and control mechanisms,
the two economies have never been so closely linked. This
new transformation has been brought about by the financial
sector. In short, the SAR has sought to affirm its identity not
by pursuing financial and monetary autonomy, guaranteed in
any case by the Basic Law, but by seeking to adapt itself as
best it can to the needs of the Chinese economy. We pres-
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1. Michel Bonnin, “Les zigzags de Pékin” in Jean-Philippe Béja (ed), Hong Kong 1997, Fin
de siècle, Fin d’un Monde? Bruxelles, Complexe, 1993, pp. 15-35 
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ent a table showing the intermeshing of the Hong Kong and
Chinese stock exchange and banking sectors, and try to
identify the strategic considerations and the macroeconomic
risks involved in these arrangements((2).
We highlight the economic and political factors which have
led to China’s increasing prominence in Hong Kong’s finan-
cial affairs since 1997. The transformation of Hong Kong’s
financial landscape is not a result of directives from Beijing,
but of a clear understanding of the interests at stake. On the
one hand, Hong Kong’s position as a Chinese financial hub
has enabled it to progress from having regional to interna-
tional significance. On the other hand, over this period, the
PRC has been in a position, within its own borders, to refine
its understanding of market mechanisms and experiment with
reforms, at the same time as holding on to its protected finan-
cial system?a non-convertible currency, and major restrictions
on the circulation of capital. Thus, within the space of ten
years, we have seen the emergence of an arrangement of a
quite specific kind which makes Chinese capitalism even
more unusual: the linking of the financial market of a devel-
oped economy to the economy of a developing country.
All the same, the model has its limitations as much for Hong
Kong as for China. On the one hand, the acceleration of the
reform process in China, linked to commitments to the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) in the financial sector, could
jeopardise Hong Kong’s privileged role under these arrange-
ments. Liberalisation upsets the status quo by reducing Hong
Kong’s competitive advantage. In addition, the increased im-
portance of China in Hong Kong’s financial sector brings
with it new risks which could affect Hong Kong as a whole.
On the other hand, from China’s point of view, using Hong
Kong to leverage funds places new constraints on currency
exchange arrangements. The system proved sustainable as
long as funds raised in Hong Kong by Chinese businesses re-
mained limited. But since stock exchange investments have
reached historic levels, the repatriation of these funds weighs
heavily on the balance of payments, and increases the pres-
sures for more a flexible currency control system. We will dis-
cuss the increased risks at the end of the article. Hong Kong,  the f inancial  her itage 
A  sophist icated f inancial  market
By 1997 the “Chinese miracle” was already largely under
way: the rate of growth was stable, the well-established
macroeconomic model was supported by an export sector
with access to a large and very cheap workforce. As with all
emerging countries, a crucial stage of development is then to
establish the basis of an efficient financial market capable of
allocating household savings to the investment needs of en-
terprises. But China’s financial institutions had a disastrous
record, and collusion between the state and the productive
sector, an inherent feature of communist systems, made this
developmental stage especially difficult. The major charac-
teristics of the Chinese financial system in the 1990s were
the dubious credit balances of the banking system as a whole
and the “casino-like” nature of Chinese stock markets((3). 
It is in this context that, in 1997, China, in taking over Hong
Kong inherited a capability that was financially competitive,
sophisticated and well regulated. Hong Kong’s banking sys-
tem included 437 credit institutions((4) and offices represent-
ing more than forty countries; 76 of the 100 major world
banks can be found in Hong Kong. In addition, it is an im-
portant currency exchange market, seventh in the world,
benefiting from the absence of exchange controls, and is also
a major centre for funds management with 195 authorised
fund managers, the heaviest concentration in Asia. Hong
Kong, which at the time of sovereignty transfer had not yet
been affected by the Asian recession, offered a profitable,
highly capitalised banking system. By the end of 1996, the
number of classified loans was 2.08% of total loans((5), while,
at the same period, in banks in mainland China, the figure
was over 40%; in 1997, the international ratio of solvency of
credit institutions reached 17.8%, more than double interna-
tional standards. In all, Hong Kong’s financial system dis-
played a level of maturity and sophistication much greater
than that of mainland China, as the president of the Hong
Kong body responsible for supervision of financial markets
put it somewhat mildly in 1997((6): 
China, after all, has only been involved in the mar-
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2. An analysis of the informal relations between Hong Kong tycoons and mainland baishu
has not resulted in an increase in corruption but would probably reveal the basis of a
new political economy that does not work to the benefit of Hong Kong’s political system.
While recognising that the question of informal economic relations between Hong Kong
and Beijing is fundamental to an understanding of the Hong Kong economy, we have
chosen not to examine it here because it involves a research programme of a different
kind. 
3. For a description of the Chinese financial system before the reform process, see, for
example, Chapter 2 of Françoise Lemoine, L’Economie chinoise, Paris, La Découverte,
2005, pp. 27-33, and Chapter 3 of OECD (ed), Economic Surveys: China, Paris, OECD,
2005, pp. 137-176.
4. Licensed banks, restricted licence banks, and deposit-taking companies.
5. Classified loans reflecting substandard, doubtful loans and losses. Source: statistics of
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
6. Annual report of the Securities and Futures Commission 1996/1997.
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ket economy for less than twenty years. Financial
markets on the mainland have been in existence for
less than seven years. By the standards of developed
countries, China’s levels of regulation lack depth,
and the legal framework lacks predictability. 
A po licy of  small  s teps :  do not  f ri ghten  in-ternational  investo rs
While the political status of the former colony was the sub-
ject of tough negotiations between British and Chinese au-
thorities, and while these negotiations resulted in theoreti-
cal political autonomy for the people of Hong Kong((7), the
agreed legislative framework aimed at preserving the Terri-
tory’s economic model and at insulating each system from
the other (cf. insert 1). In other words, it was a question
of not killing the goose that laid the golden eggs!
Thus, at the outset, the mainland authorities took great
pains after the transfer of sovereignty to reassure foreign in-
vestors about their intentions. So, paradoxically, it was
more difficult after 1997 for a Chinese Communist Party
cadre to obtain a visa for Hong Kong than it had been be-
fore((8). In addition, Jiang Zemin showed a lack of interest
in southern China, which he considered too rich and pow-
erful, preferring Shanghai, which he wished to restore to
its rightful place. But in 2003 the situation changed: the
Hong Kong economy, convalescing after the Asian finan-
cial crisis in 1997, was brought to a halt by the SARS epi-
demic. 
It became urgent to find a strategy to restart Hong
Kong’s economy. The replacement of Jiang by Hu Jintao,
secretary general since 2003, provided the political cli-
mate for a rapprochement between Beijing and Hong
Kong. A bilateral arrangement for a free market between
Hong Kong and mainland China, the CEPA((9), was
signed in 2003. As well as allowing the free circulation of
goods, this arrangement included an important financial
provision aimed at giving Hong Kong financial institu-
tions more flexible conditions of access to the Chinese
market. This bilateral arrangement thus signalled a clear
intention to speed up the economic and financial integra-
tion of the two zones, a development which Hong Kong
now greeted with enthusiasm. In short, in ten years,
China’s one-sided interests in Hong Kong have been
transformed into mutual interests; the question for Hong
Kong no longer being so much to preserve its autonomy
and foster its individuality but to profit from China’s eco-
nomic take-off and position itself as the hub for the coun-
try’s financial services. Well  understood interests
In  Hong Kong’s  case ,  p ro fit ing  from newstock exchange  developments… 
Although the creation of channels for China-incorporated
companies to list their shares directly or indirectly in Hong
Kong dates from 1992((10), the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
(HKSE), up to the time of the transfer of sovereignty, dealt
mainly with British and Hong Kong interests. Thus, in 1997,
of the 15 largest enterprises listed in Hong Kong, only one
was Chinese and less than 10% of Hong Kong’s market cap-
italisation was in Chinese firms. The real estate, construc-
tion and public works sectors were strongly represented. Ten
years after the handover, the scene has changed consider-
ably: half of Hong Kong’s stock exchange market capitalisa-
tion is by Chinese enterprises((11). Of the 15 largest firms
listed in Hong Kong in December 2006, six were from
mainland China((12). The banking and energy sectors are now
heavily represented. 
In Hong Kong, the financial services sector is the second
most important in GDP terms((13), and is a driving force in
the economy. The entry of Chinese firms into the stock mar-
ket has thus been a godsend for the SAR. Of the ten largest
initial public offerings (IPO) ever recorded in Hong Kong,
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7. An enlightening description of the issues involved in the sovereignty negotiations can be
found in Michel Bonin, Les zigzags de Pékin, op. cit., pp. 15-35 
8. Wenhui Zhu, “Toward an Integrating Market: The Future of Hong Kong’s Economy And
Its Interaction With The Chinese Mainland”, CNAPS Working Paper Series, 2005 avail-
able at http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/zhu20051017.htm. 
9. CEPA or the Close Economic Partnership Arrangement, was signed in June 2003 and
came into force on 1 January 2004. Between 2003 and 2005 three sets of measures
were added to enhance even further the effects of the arrangements.
10. The listing of Chinese enterprises in Hong Kong takes two forms: H shares, reserved for
Chinese companies, and Red Chips, reserved for Chinese companies with subsidiaries
in Hong Kong through which they enter the stock market. 
11. 25.4% in the form of H shares, and 22.3% as Red Chips.
12. China Mobile, Industrial and Commercial Bank, Bank of China (H shares), CNOOC,
Petrochina, Bank of China Ltd (red chip)
13. The first is the trade and logistics sector which accounts for 23% of GDP. 
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In 2003, several factors affected investors’ confidence
in Hong Kong. Among them, the SARS epidemic and
Beijing’s attempt to impose article 23 legislation.
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ten were Chinese. The scale factor exerted by China has
consequently also made itself felt in financial terms: the
amount of capital raised on the exchange by Chinese enter-
prises has beaten all records. Eclipsing China Construction
Bank in 2005, with US$9.1 billion, the listing on the
HKSE of Industrial and Commercial Bank led in 2006 to
the raising of US$16 billion, thus effecting the largest stock
exchange IPO ever seen in the world. Bank of China, which
also entered the HKSE, raised US$11.1 billion, while Mer-
chant Bank, a business of more modest size, raised US$2.6
billion 
Thus, from a financial centre of regional significance, Hong
Kong grew in 2006 to being fourth in world ranking in terms
of funds raised, behind New York, Euronext and London,
reaching US$67 billion((14).…and conquer ing the  Chinese  bankingmarket
Moreover, although regarded in the PRC as foreign credit
Insert 1: “One country, two systems”:preserving Hong Kong’s legal framework …
To preserve the framework favourable to business estab-
lished by the British administration, the Basic Law was
adopted in 1997. It was based on the joint declaration
signed by the United Kingdom and the PRC in 1984 (1). 
Hong Kong and the business community were assured
that ‘the socialist system and socialist policies will not be
in force in the Special Administrative Region, which will
maintain unchanged the previous capitalist system and
way of life of the Territory for fifty years to come’. Hong
Kong remains a fiscal, customs, and monetary territory
which is completely independent from mainland China (2).
The Territory maintains its currency, the HKD, which is
freely convertible (3), and complete freedom of movement
of capital (4). Complementing these principles, the
Central Bank of China (PBOC) solemnly undertook to
maintain ‘two mutually independent currencies, mone-
tary systems and monetary authorities’, and not to make
use of the Hong Kong’s currency reserves, in any form
(5), and to prohibit fiscal transfers.
1. Joint declaration of the government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on the question of Hong Kong, December 19,
1984.
2. Article 109
3. Article 112
4. Article 113
5. On the other hand, contrary to the strict principle of independence,
the PBOC stands ready to support the Hong Kong currency, if 
necessary, at the request of the HKMA.
Table 1. The 10 largest entries on the Hong
Kong stock exchange since 1993
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14. Source: World Exchange Federation data, December 2006.
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institutions, Hong Kong banks receive preferential treatment
under the CEPA which reduces—though it does not re-
move–the extremely restrictive conditions governing access to
the Chinese banking system by foreign investors((15). Through
businesses located in mainland China, Hong Kong banks also
enjoy privileged treatment for insurance products and services. 
Thus, of the ten foreign enterprises most firmly established in
China at the end of 2006, half are Hong Kong-based credit
institutions or credit institutions with strong historical links
with Hong Kong. Several credit institutions, either Hong
Kong-owned or with a presence in Hong Kong, have also
taken out major strategic interests in Chinese banks, in partic-
ular HSBC which owns 19.9% of the Bank of Communica-
tions, 8% of the Bank of Shanghai and a 16% indirect inter-
est in Industrial Bank, via its subsidiary Hang Seng Bank.
The CEPA has undeniably played a role in the favourable
positioning of Hong Kong banks in China, even if the num-
ber of establishments benefiting from the arrangements might
seem relatively small((16): at the end of December 2006, only
eight Hong Kong-based banks had become eligible under
the CEPA((17), which does not seem many given the 200
credit institutions in Hong Kong. An equally important fac-
tor for Hong Kong firms is their understanding of the market
near their border and the previous well-established relation-
ships with Chinese authorities. In sum, the importance of the
CEPA seems to spring as much from the favourable policy
signals the PRC sends to the SAR as from the granting of
decisive competitive advantages to Hong Kong banks.
For China ,  f inanc ing it s economy…
In 2000 the HKSE took over from mainland exchanges, as-
suming principal responsibility for the issue of Chinese
stocks, enabling the emergence of a derivative market related
to Chinese stocks, and finally realising the IPO of the major
Chinese banks, a crucial step in bank reform. 
One should therefore see the stock exchange developments
of 2005 and 2006 as a logical extension of the replacement
role that the Hong Kong exchange has played since 2000.
Given the dysfunctional state of exchanges in mainland
China, Hong Kong had only to occupy a position that had
already been left vacant. Indeed, practices in Shanghai and
Shenzhen until the 2006 reform were characterised by
fraudulent dealings, non-existent accounting transparency,
shares mostly non-tradable and the issue of stocks without
prior regulatory checks. In the expectation of reform, de-
mand for stocks therefore became paralysed. This explains
why the stock exchange indicators between 2001 and 2005
in no way reflected the real rate of growth in China: while
the country’s GDP doubled over this period, stock exchange
indicators and the capitalisation of Shanghai and Shenzhen
fell by half((18). As a source of finance for the Chinese econ-
omy issue of stocks therefore played a very small role.
In this context, Hong Kong seems a comfortable alternative
for Chinese enterprises seeking to raise capital. This finan-
cial hub, which has maintained a regulatory framework con-
forming to international standards, therefore listed stocks
Table 2. The leading 10 foreign banking
institutions most widely represented in China
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
15. For Hong Kong banks, the CEPA has lowered the credit threshold for a foreign bank
wishing to establish itself in China from US$20 billion to US$6 billion. Hong Kong banks
can offer services in renminbi and in foreign currency transactions two years after open-
ing a branch compared with the three currently required for foreign banks. While China’s
regulations require foreign banks to show a profit in each branch to gain a licence to
operate in renminbi, the CEPA allows an overall calculation of profits for all branches.
16. In the absence of a list of the names of credit institutions benefiting from the CEPA, a
precise impact study is difficult to undertake.
17. Which includes three medium-sized Hong Kong banks, which claimed to benefit from it,
and, more surprisingly, two subsidiaries of Chinese banks, CITIC and Bank of China.
18. Anne Laure Delatte and Maud Savary-Mornet, “Hong Kong, plate-forme financière de la
Chine continentale”, Revue Banque, nº 688, 2007.
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from Chinese enterprises which appeared solidly based.
Figure 3 summarises the increased importance Hong Kong
has assumed in financing Chinese enterprises. In total, in
2004, stock exchange capitalisation in Hong Kong for Chi-
nese businesses rose to US$240 billion, that is, almost double
the capitalisation in play on mainland exchanges (US$140 bil-
lion). In 2005, this ratio again increased: the value of stocks
of Chinese enterprises in Hong Kong was three times greater
than in mainland China (US$385 billion). 
In this context, it is worth taking a closer look at 2003, which
was a turning-point in the utilisation of Hong Kong’s financial ca-
pability by Chinese enterprises. This development is linked to
the strategy of mainland authorities to place Hong Kong at the
heart of the reform of China’s state enterprises, especially those
in the banking sector. The consolidation of their assets through
the inclusion of foreign strategic investors was made possible by
the record IPO detailed above: ICBC, Bank of China, China
Construction Bank, China Merchant Bank. 
In short, China has provided itself with a sophisticated financial
centre on its border, wholly dedicated to its own economic de-
velopment. Hong Kong also represents a testing ground for its
future reforms. 
… exper imenting and  gaining  regulatoryknowledge  …
Over the decade, the Hong Kong banking sector has con-
tributed only very moderately to the financing of the Chi-
nese economy. In March 2007, outstanding loans by the
Hong Kong banking sector to its mainland Chinese counter-
parts was low compared with the funds raised by Chinese
enterprises on the HKSE in 2007 (HKD 384 billion), and
this was even a 5% reduction compared with 1997((19). The
regulatory and prudential restrictions on loans to Chinese es-
tablishments by foreign banks, as well as the collapse of
GITIC((20) in 1999, also probably acted over the decade as
brakes on the expansion of the Hong Kong banking sector
vis-à-vis Chinese counterparts.
All the same, one should not underestimate the interaction
between the Hong Kong banking sector and the Chinese
economy. Indeed, the SAR enabled Chinese banks situated
in Hong Kong to acquaint themselves, under relatively
favourable conditions, with the rules of the game in a liber-
alised banking sector. It also allowed them to adapt to inter-
national prudential standards.
The subsidiaries of Chinese banks in Hong Kong((21) were, over
the course of the decade, able to gain experience of the opera-
tional rules of a liberal system, under conditions tempered by
the geographic and cultural proximity of the Hong Kong mar-
ket and, in any case, less difficult than those applying in more
distant markets. This apprenticeship was also made easier by
the long-established cartelised nature of the Hong Kong bank-
ing market, which has only been truly liberalised in relatively re-
cent times (from 1999 to 2001)((22).
For Chinese banks, Hong Kong has also played the role of a
training school in risk management. The SAR is in fact a pio-
neer in Asia of the most advanced international banking stan-
Table 3. Total and negotiable capitalisation in
mainland China and capitalisation of Chinese
enterprises in Hong Kong.
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19. Looking at total financial flows, the PRC even seems to have been the only geographic
zone with which the Hong Kong banking system is in a net debit position in December
2006, to the tune of HKD 130 billion, unlike the United Kingdom (with a net credit posi-
tion of HKD 965 billion) or the United States (net credit position of HKD 228 billion). 
20. The collapse of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation in
October 1998 left a total estimated debt of HKD 33 billion, spread across 120 credit
institutions, mainly in Hong Kong. Following this collapse, credits in Hong Kong-based
banks for Chinese entities fell from 4.5% of total credits in September 1998 to 3.4% in
December 1999. 
21. From 35 in 1997, their number fell to 16 in 2006 following various mergers and acqui-
sitions, in particular the merger in 2001 of the ten banks of the Bank of China consor-
tium into a single entity.
22. The Hong Kong authorities have introduced reforms to modify the operation of the Hong
Kong banking system, which has been seen as too oligopolistic. Several measures have
been adopted to foster competition among credit institutions: deregulation of interest
rates, in 2001; facilitation of market access by foreign banks from 1999; and encour-
agement for mergers-acquisitions among institutions.
23. Hong Kong began to apply the Cooke ratio in 1989, well in advance of the Basel date
which provided for a start date at the end of 1992. Monitoring of market risk began in
1997, shortly after the recommendations of the Basel committee in January 1996. For
Basel 2: the start date is in 2007 (simple forms) and in 2008 (more complex forms) while
Chinese authorities have set no start no implementation date for their banking system.
N o  2 0 0 7 / 2 63
Made In China, Financed In Hong Kong
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
dards, whether this be for market risk or for international mini-
mum requirements regarding credit institutions’ own funds((23).
Chinese banks in Hong Kong are of course subject to these
standards, which have allowed them to master risk management
more rapidly than if they were closeted in their home market((24).
. . .  and test ing –  modestly –  the  externa lconver t ib il i ty  of  the r enminbi
Finally, since 2004, Hong Kong banks have been able to
offer banking services in renminbi to their individual cus-
tomers only: deposits, currency exchanges and transfers in
renminbi, and credit/debit cards in renminbi, which can be
used in the PRC. Like retail businesses, the banks can also
accept credit cards issued by Chinese continental banks, as
well as renminbi in cash. For the present these measures are
only available for individuals, not for enterprises; which ex-
plains why the use of such services has remained very mar-
ginal (for example, deposits in renminbi only represent 0.5%
of total deposits in Hong Kong banks). The extension of
these measures to enterprises, in particular authority to pay
for import/ export activities in renminbi, has been an-
nounced—though without any specific timetable—and this
will be a crucial step towards the free convertibility of the
renminbi, once more reaffirming Hong Kong’s status as an
arena for experimentation and learning. 
In sum, the contribution of the HKSE to Chinese reforms
has been obvious in the many listings by Chinese enterprises
over the decade; in addition, Chinese banks in Hong Kong
have been able to adjust to the operational rules of an inter-
national banking centre. This specific state of affairs—a de-
veloping economy which has a sophisticated financial market
available on its doorstep—has been a great asset for China,
which until now has been shut away on its own territory from
short-term foreign capital. All the same, joining the WTO
could well change the current arrangements and place Hong
Kong is a less favourable situation where it will need to deal
with new competitors. On the other hand, this strategy
brings new risks, which are discussed below. Towards  a  new equil ibrium
The WTO agreements  reduce  the  r egula -tory advantages benefi t ing banks based  inHong Kong
In the context of its admission to the WTO in 2001, China
undertook to open up its banking sector from 11 December
2006. Although the extent of liberalisation of the Chinese
market is still limited((25), these new arrangements automati-
cally reduce the comparative advantages which the CEPA
conferred on Hong Kong banks.
All the same, as explained above, the CEPA alone does not
explain the advantage that Hong Kong banks had already
acquired. The latter remain in a favourable position to dom-
inate the Chinese banking market by virtue of their close-
ness in cultural terms accentuated by the increasing involve-
ment of Hong Kong in the Pearl River Delta and the well-
established nature of policies relating to China. Moreover,
the strategy developed by foreign banks until then for in-
volvement in Chinese banks seemed less attractive since
Chinese authorities may have confirmed their intention of
not lifting the ceiling for capital participation of foreign
banks in the capital of a Chinese bank above 20%. Also, the
establishment of a network of ad hoc subsidiaries in China
may seem to be the best option for foreign banks, as in this
process banks located in Hong Kong may enjoy a relative
advantage given their proximity to Chinese markets and
their well established links with Chinese authorities. Those
foreign banks seeking to establish a network of subsidiaries
in China whose discussions with Chinese regulators have
reached the most advanced stage are, moreover, principally
those which are already established in Hong Kong((26). 
Increased competi t ion  from Shanghai  andmajor int ernational  centres  leads HongKong  to further ad just  its  pos it ion  in  re la -t ion to  China 
Far from simply living off the benefits available to it by virtue
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24. There remains the question, which we have not discussed here for lack of space, of
skills transfer from Hong Kong subsidiaries to parent institutions in mainland China.
25. China undertook to remove the non-prudential measures applicable until then to foreign
banks wishing to enter the Chinese market; however, it did not undertake to remove the
prudential measures, a situation which enables it, like most countries in the area, more-
over, to continue to exercise regulatory measures to protect its banking market from for-
eign participants. Despite the formal liberalisation of the banking system within the
framework of the WTO, the process of obtaining a banking licence in China remains
complex and costly. Foreign players are strongly encouraged to work through sub-
sidiaries, a method which is very costly in terms of capital (1 billion yuan for a sub-
sidiary, 200 million yuan for a branch). In addition there is a profitability test which
applies to the subsidiary of the foreign bank if it is to obtain a renminbi licence, and a
requirement to show that the bank has been in operation for more than three years and
has been profitable for at least two consecutive years. Foreign banks choosing to estab-
lish themselves in the form of branches can only accept deposits for more than 1 mil-
lion yuan and cannot issue credit cards. In addition, participation in a Chinese bank by
a foreign entity is limited to 20% of capital for individual participation and 25% for a
group of investors. 
26. As well as the American Citigroup there is HSBC, Standard Chartered and the Bank of
East Asia, a Hong Kong bank: The Standard, 17 April 2007. 
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Made In China, Financed In Hong Kong
of its privileged position in arrangements for the reform of
Chinese banks and large state enterprises, the Hong Kong
stock market needs to deal with increasing competition. To
start with, there is competition from mainland China. For
the first time, in mid-April 2007, total stock exchange capi-
talisation in Shanghai and Shenzhen has exceeded that of
Hong Kong. Reform of mainland financial markets resulted
in the resumption of IPOs on the Shanghai stock exchange,
successfully initiated by the double listing of ICBC in Octo-
ber 2006. The leading Chinese credit institution in fact en-
joyed the largest IPOs in terms of funds raised—21.9 billion
yuan raised simultaneously in Hong Kong and Shanghai. At
the same time, Chinese authorities seem to want, perhaps
temporarily, to favour mainland markets. Although no offi-
cial announcement has been made, the CRSC, which is re-
quired to approve all requests of IPOs of Chinese enter-
prises on the stock exchange, is thought to have been en-
couraging enterprises since the beginning of 2007 to give
preference to funds raised on the mainland markets (in the
form of A shares), at the expense of those from the Hong
Kong market (H shares). Thus, in the coming weeks, it is
expected that there will be several IPOs on the Shanghai
market of large Chinese enterprises already listed in Hong
Kong (China Mobile, Petrochina, Chalco, Bank of Commu-
nications((27).) On the other hand, as the HKSE authorities
are stressing((28), Chinese firms are, as part of their interna-
tionalisation strategy, now looking for funds in other mar-
kets—in Europe, America((29) or Asia.
This increasing competition is, as one would expect, leading
Hong Kong to position itself in ways best adapted to the
needs of the Chinese economy. This strategy emerges
clearly in several documents((30) developed by Hong Kong au-
thorities following the eleventh plan, which forms an impor-
tant element of the necessary reforms of the financial sector
in the PRC. The strategy developed by the Hong Kong au-
thorities is formulated around two principal ideas. On the
one hand, the aim is to position Hong Kong’s financial cen-
tre as the key agent in the reform process in the Chinese fi-
nancial sector. Hong Kong’s financial centre would put its
expertise and infrastructure at the service of the gradual,
progressive opening of the Chinese capital account. On the
other hand, Hong Kong’s aim would be to strengthen its in-
stitutional links with mainland authorities by means of “com-
plementary, co-operative and interactive” relations((31). Here
we can plainly see the distance covered since the transfer of
sovereignty …
Accordingly, Hong Kong authorities are promoting a num-
ber of projects to their Chinese counterparts. The first plank
of development concerns arrangements allowing Chinese in-
stitutional investors to invest a portion of Chinese savings
abroad. The QDII((32) could be extended to Hong Kong
share markets, either directly, or through funds. Within the
context of a partial opening of the Chinese capital account,
the wealthiest individual Chinese investors would be permit-
ted to make foreign currency investments in Hong Kong on
an experimental basis limited to individuals with funds in ex-
cess of 1 million yuan. The second plank is the extension of
the off-shore renminbi market, begun in 2003 on an experi-
mental basis, which could be enlarged by developing an or-
ganised market for contracts, futures and options for the ren-
minbi((33). Other measures would build on the sophisticated
nature of Hong Kong as a centre which could become an or-
ganised market for debenture listings in renminbi. This final
measure seems to be the one that has reached the most ad-
vanced stage because the Hong Kong authorities have an-
nounced several times that the arrangements would be in
place by the end of 2007. Chinese financial institutions
could thus issue bonds denominated in renminbi, which
would be listed and traded in Hong Kong.The  ambiguiti es  of  the  Hong Kong/China f inancial  integration
Vulnerab il it y to f luctuations  in  China
Hong Kong today is, admittedly, in a favourable situation
which allows it to derive great benefit from the burgeoning
Chinese economy. All the same, this situation is not without
its problems: China’s increasing involvement in Hong
Kong’s financial activities increases the latter’s risk levels.
Thus, today, the Hang Seng index is sensitive to develop-
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27. Nisha Gopalan, “China pushes for listings”, Wall Street Journal, 18 April 2007.
28. Presentation by Paul Chow, HK ex Chief Executive, entitled “The Evolving Role of Hong
Kong as a Securities Market for the Mainland”, at the HKU Foundation annual meeting
cum HKU Luncheon Talk, 12 March 2007; available at HKex website
http://www.hkex.com.hk/index.htm.
29. Certain Chinese enterprises are moreover already listed on other international
exchanges, mainly in New York and London.
30. See Li David (Ed), “Report of the Focus Group on Financial Services”, January 2007,
available at http://www.info.gov.hk/info/econ_summit/eng/pdf/fs.pdf. The Focus Group
on Financial Services is a working group of representatives of the financial industry and
the Hong Kong government, chaired by David Li.
31. Li David (Ed), “Report of the Focus Group on Financial Services”, op. cit. p. 1.
32. Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors, financial institutions incorporated in mainland
China authorised to acquire shares on foreign exchanges. 
33. Hong Kong already has an OTC market for renminbi NDF (non deliverable futures) for
institutional investors. 
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ments in China: for example, on 28 February 2007, the 10%
fall in the Shanghai index led to a fall of 3% in the Hang
Seng. Similarly, following the announcement by the Peo-
ple’s Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank, on 29
April 2007 of a tightening of monetary conditions in China,
the overall Hong Kong index fell 1% in a day. Volatility of
the mainland’s stock exchanges is likely to increase still fur-
ther in 2007: the Shanghai stock exchange index has gone
up 220% since the first semester of 2006 without the same
tendency showing up in profits; China’s high rate of savings
and the scarcity of investment opportunities in China com-
bine to make the stock exchange highly attractive, to the
point of triggering highly speculative investment behaviours.
The very strong demand has pushed stock exchange indexes
to levels that some consider unsustainable. The rare foreign
institutional investors in China maintain very cashed-up in
order to enable them to withdraw quickly in case of a turn-
around. Very short-term investments by the institutional sec-
tor mean that the indexes are susceptible to sudden, major
changes. Many observers believe that the growth of main-
land indexes cannot continue at this rate((34). The question
now is to know whether Chinese exchanges are in for a hard
or a soft landing. What will the consequences of the landing
be for Hong Kong? How will Hong Kong’s international in-
vestors react? As already said, the Hong Kong economy is
heavily exposed to the financial sector. The crisis in 1997
showed that a fall in the Hang Seng index, far from being
limited to the stock exchange market, had systemic conse-
quences for the rest of the economy.
Moreover, the risks are not restricted to Hong Kong alone.
For China, this model has its limitations, as we will now
show.
Hong Kong… in  the  Chinese  balance  ofpayments
Hong Kong is, it is true, an undeniable asset for China’s
economic development. A major feature of Hong Kong is
that it is completely open to movements of international cap-
ital. Thus, in 2004 and 2005((35), foreign investors con-
tributed 36% of transactions on the share market, and 23%
on the market for derivatives. Foreign investors in share trad-
ing are based mainly in the United States (29%), the
United Kingdom (25%), and the rest of Europe (22%), the
Asian sector being relatively weak (13%). In other words,
since 2000, and not only in 2005 and 2006, China has
been quite openly exposed to foreign stock market capital
through the intermediary of Hong Kong. 
But there is a strong contradiction in a policy that maintains
a closed capital account, associated with arrangements for
controlling capital flows, while at the same time calling on
international savings from beyond its borders. China today
depends on the stability of its currency. This is in fact one
Insert 2: What role did funds raised inHong Kong play in the record entries?
Until 2003, funds raised in Hong Kong were for the
most part repatriated to China and converted into RMB
in order to finance investments on Chinese territory.
However, the success of China’s investments overseas
since 2003, about which a lot has been written, and
which has been greeted with varying degrees of concern
in the developed world, might well have been financed
by capital raised in Hong Kong.  Since the purpose to
which funds raised on the exchange are put does not
need to be declared once the listing on the exchange has
been effected, there is no systematic way of identifying
it. The result has been arrived at by carefully examining
the annual reports of the leading 15 Chinese enterprises
listed in Hong Kong and also noting the statements of
investments and acquisitions by these enterprises in the
economic and financial press. If there is a short delay
between listing and investment or acquisition, it has been
assumed there is a causal link. 
Thus, China Construction Bank, which had raised funds
in November 2005, announced the acquisition of Bank
of America Asia (1) for USD 1.24 billion in 2006.
Similarly, ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China), whose listing in Hong Kong dates from
November 2006, acquired 90% of the holdings of the
Indonesian bank Halim in January 2007. In July 2006,
six months after its fund raising, Bank of China,
announced the acquisition of all the holdings of
Singapore Aircraft for US$ 965 million. And on August
23, 2006, PetroChina acquired 67% of the capital issued
by PetroKazakhstan. 
1. A franchise in Hong Kong and Macao of  Bank of America Corporation
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34. For the risk of a speculative bubble on mainland markets, see Henry Ho and Louis Shan,
“Where are China shares going?”, UBS report, Hong Kong, 7 May 2007.
35. “The international dimension of HKex Securities Market-investors and brokers”, The
Exchange, Hong Kong Exchange, N. July, 2006.
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36. Despite the authorised appreciation of the renminbi since July 2005, the currency
exchange regime can still be regarded as a controlled system.
37. On this topic see for example, Anne Laure Delatte “Is the Chinese Current Exchange Rate
Regime Sustainable?” China Perspectives, vol. 67, 2006, pp. 11-20.
38. On this topic see Michael Goujon and Samuel Guerineau, “The Modification of the
Chinese Exchange Rate Policy”, China Perspectives, vol. 64, 2006, pp. 34-44. 
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of the pillars of its growth as it depends in large measure on
the export sector. Too much volatility would mean great un-
certainty. This is, in any case, the implicit justification for
the authorities’ attachment to its currency arrangements((36).
Now, it is because capital is not free to move in and out of
the country that the exchange rate of the renminbi is able to
remain linked to fluctuations of the dollar while at the same
time offering an interest rate higher than the United States.
But the PRC is a victim of its economic success. The record
accumulation of foreign currency reserves in the PBOC is a
reflection of this. Until now the reserves have been essen-
tially linked to the current account surplus—China’s commer-
cial success. But since 2003, capital has been there in abun-
dance, despite the controls((37): because there are exceptions,
and faults in the system, but also because foreigners can buy
shares on the stock exchange in listed Chinese enterprises …
from Hong Kong. Thus, the PRC is playing an ambiguous
game by limiting financial dealings between Chinese and
foreigners within its borders yet at the same time calling on
international savings via Hong Kong. 
This situation could now be working against China. Indeed,
the funds raised by new entrants on the exchange outside
China further accentuate the currency exchange problem.
Thus the listing of Chinese banks on foreign exchanges be-
tween 2005 and 2006 represented a fund raising of US$90
billion in all, US$50 billion of which came from Hong
Kong. The repatriation of such sums, and their conversion,
further increase the demand for renminbi, thus posing a sig-
nificant problem for the authorities in charge of currency ex-
change (the State Administration of Foreign Exchange
(SAFE) and the PBOC). The latter have certainly tried
discreetly to limit the repatriation of these funds. Thus, it is
likely that the foreign acquisitions described in Insert 2 re-
ceived active support if not outright encouragement by the
authorities. But the presence of assets in US dollars weighs
more and more heavily on the balance sheets. The latter de-
preciate by 5% per annum on average compared with the
renminbi, causing proportional exchange rate losses. Thus,
Guo Shuqing, the CEO of China Construction Bank, an
enterprise whose IPO on the HKSE dates from 2005, com-
plained publicly in 2006 about being “forced” (implicitly by
the SAFE) to maintain these funds in US dollars while they
were depreciating, causing exchange losses of the order of
300 million US dollars. The appreciation of the renminbi
relative to the US dollar calls for a rational reallocation of
US dollars assets in renminbi. This finally happened at the
beginning of 2007 as Wu Xiaoling, vice-governor of the
PBOC, eventually confirmed in April 2007: the increase
between the first trimesters of 2006 and 2007 of 37% of ex-
change reserves (sic), which pushed China into the number
one position in the world, is thought to reflect in part the
trading surplus but also the fact that Chinese enterprises,
motivated by anticipated appreciations of the renminbi,
repatriated funds raised on foreign exchanges, despite the re-
strictions. Thus Hong Kong becomes embroiled in the diffi-
cult question of the Chinese exchange rate regime((38).Conclus ion
The long-standing economic relations between Hong Kong
and the PRC have intensified since the handover at a pace
few foresaw. Alongside the increasing economic links, the fi-
nancial sector has been an important driver of integration.
This intensification has taken place in successive stages:
after a dormant period designed to preserve the balance pro-
vided for in the agreements reached at the time of the trans-
fer of sovereignty, the CEPA in 2003 was the signal for a
policy of preferential treatment for Hong Kong. Banks lo-
cated in Hong Kong found they were beneficiaries of pref-
erential policies for access to the Chinese market. But the
most spectacular step was taken in 2003 in the stock ex-
change area. Hong Kong was given a privileged position in
the stock exchange IPOs of the large state enterprises and
the banks. This recourse to Hong Kong served a dual pur-
pose: it validated the reform process undertaken by the Chi-
nese authorities, especially in the banking sector, and it pro-
vided access to the only Chinese stock exchange attracting
foreign savings. For Hong Kong, the record funds raised on
its exchange were a godsend for its economy. All the same,
Hong Kong’s financial integration with China is not without
its risks because China is an emerging financial market
which is both speculative and volatile. Without calling into
question this dual purpose, we may wonder whether it would
be worthwhile considering other strategies that would put
Hong Kong in a position that is less dependent on economic
and financial fluctuations in China—by acting, for example,
as a financial centre for Asia as a whole, in the manner of
Singapore. •
• Translated by Peter Brown
Made In China, Financed In Hong Kong
